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CIVIL RIGHTS - SHADES OF RACE: AN HISTORICALLY IN
FORMED READING OF TITLE VII
INTRODUCTION
This Note will argue that current 'reverse discrimination' juris
prudence under Title VII is fundamentally flawed, and that it is
flawed because jurists have lost sight of the originating purposes of
Title VII as part of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.1 The Note begins in
Part I with an exegesis of a recent case, Tappe v. Alliance Capital
Management,z in order to examine the theme that all persons, of
whatever race, must receive the same prima facie analysis under the
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene 3 employment discrimination
test. Part II will explore the word 'discrimination' within the con
text of this nation's long history of white oppression of blacks; next,
Part III will discuss the history surrounding the adoption of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. This history will go beyond the standard
'legislative history,' although it will address that as well, to look to
the larger social and cultural events at the time to determine what
wrongs the Act was designed to remedy. Part IV presents employ
ment statistics showing what effects Title VII has had over time in
opening up employment to African Americans on an equal basis
with their white counterparts. Parts V, VI and VII will examine the
way the Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning and purpose
of Title VII in the context of affirmative action. Part VIII will view
and critique the arguments of those opposed to allowing Title VII
to recognize race as a legitimate criteria, in certain circumstances,
for making employment decisions. Finally, Part IX will argue that
the purposes of Title VII and the 1964 Civil Rights Act are frus
trated by the jurisprudence of cases like Tappe. This Note con
cludes that a reasonable and just reading of the statute requires that
jurists recognize the larger objectives of the Act when they are de
ciding how to analyze reverse discrimination cases.
I.

TAPPE V. ALLIANCE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

In 2000, Wayne Tappe, a white male, brought suit against his
1.
2.
3.

42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).
177 F. Supp. 2d 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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employer, Alliance Capital Management, alleging, among other
things, that his employer had violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act by discriminating against him because of his race. 4 Alli
ance had fired Tappe, a portfolio manager in the firm's High Yield
group, on December 8, 1999, the day he was to receive his yearly
bonus. s At the time, Tappe was thirty-eight years 01d. 6 There were
four other portfolio managers in the group, none of whom were
fired; three of those managers were women, one of the women,
black. 7 The fourth manager was a fifty-five year old white male. s
When Tappe asked why he was fired, his superior, Wayne Lyski,
told him only that he "did not fit with the profile of the High Yield
Group and its strategy going forward."9
Tappe filed a complaint against Alliance alleging numerous
causes, including that he was discriminated against because of his
race and sex in violation of Title VII. In his complaint, Tappe al
leged that he was singled out to be fired because each of the other
managers was "a member of a protected class by virtue of his or her
gender, race and/or age."l0 The only evidence produced by Tappe
in support of this allegation was the statement by Lyski that Tappe
did not "fit with the profile of the High Yield Group."ll In re
sponse to his allegations, Alliance filed a motion to dismiss Tappe's
suit for failure to raise a claim for which a court might grant relief. 12
In analyzing Tappe's claims to determine if they would survive
the defense's motion to dismiss, the court used the McDonnell
Douglas "burden shifting framework" established by the Supreme
Court in 1973. 13 This four-part test allows a plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) he is
within a protected group, (2) he is qualified for the position, (3) he
was subject to an adverse employment action, (4) and the adverse
action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination based on membership in the protected group.14
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Tappe, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 179.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. (citing N.Y.C. Admin. Code Section 8-1D7(a)). The age claim stems from
the New York City Human Rights statute. Id.
11. Id. at 180.
12. !d. at 179.
13. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
14. Tappe, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 180. The original test from McDonnell Douglas
read:
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If Tappe failed to meet anyone prong of this test, his claims of
discrimination would be dismissed. If Tappe could meet the test,

then "a presumption of discrimination [would be] created and the
burden of production [would] shift[ ] to the defendant to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employ
ment action or terrnination."15 In its motion, Alliance argued that
Tappe could not meet the first and fourth prongs of the McDonnell
Douglas test. 16 Although at first blush it would seem clear that
Tappe would never be able to meet the first or fourth prongs of the
McDonnell Douglas test because he is a white male, the court in
fact found that Tappe was a member of a protected class and so did
meet the first prong of the test. 17
It is worthwhile reviewing the court's reasoning on this issue,
because it lays out a new and apparently unprecedented argument
in favor of allowing "majority" plaintiffs like Tappe to be protected
in precisely the same way as minority plaintiffs under the McDon
nell Douglas test for a presumptive violation of Title VII. The first
question for the court was "whether a plaintiff in a 'reverse discrim
ination' lawsuit must allege special circumstances to qualify as a
member of a protected group ...."18 The court in Tappe pointed
out that the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans
portation CO.19 had said that Title VII "does not distinguish be
tween traditional and non-traditional plaintiffs."20 And as the court
in Tappe noted, McDonald had held that what was prohibited by
Title VII was "discriminatory preference for any [racial] group, mi
nority or majority."21 The Tappe court also noted that the McDon
ald Court had found its reverse discrimination case
"indistinguishable from McDonnell Douglas" in holding that the
court must use the same standard to judge "members of all races,"
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
15. Tappe, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (citing Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d
91, 98 (2d Cir. 2001».
16. [d. at 181.
17. [d. at 182.
18. [d. at 181 (citing Iadimarco v. Runyan, 190 F.3d 151, 160 (3rd Cir. 1999)).
19. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
20. Tappe, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
21. [d. (quoting McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279) (emphasis omitted).
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when deciding whether to dismiss their cases. 22
The Tappe court said that requiring Tappe to meet a standard
different than that required by minority plaintiffs, like the com
monly applied "background circumstances" test,23 would subject
him to a "higher burden" than a minority plaintiff in a like situ a
tion.24 To place similarly situated plaintiffs on different footing
would then subject the court's decision to "heightened constitu
tional scrutiny."25 This finding would be unacceptable because
"courts ... must provide equal protection of the laws. "26 While not
all racial distinctions are unconstitutional, any such distinctions
"raise serious constitutional issues and must first survive a height
ened equal protection scrutiny."27 The court quoted the Supreme
Court's ruling in INS v. St. Cyr28 to the effect that an interpretation
which avoids serious constitutional problems is the best choice if
the statute can be fairly read to avoid such problems. 29 Because the
court in Tappe found that giving all plaintiffs the right to the same
standard of pleading is "fairly possible," all plaintiffs must have the
same pleading standard-a result which the court said follows from
"Title VII's plain language as well as the precedent of the Supreme
Court and this Circuit."30 Therefore, said the court, Tappe meets
the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test. 3!
The fourth prong, however, Tappe was not able to fulfill, at
least not upon the facts alleged: first, that he had been terminated
because "he did not fit with the profile of the High Yield group"
and second, that every other member of the High Yield group was a
member of a protected group "by virtue of his or her gender, race
and/or age."32 These facts were not enough, according to the court,
22. [d. at 181-82. In addition, the Tappe court cited a recent Supreme Court deci
sion which held that sex discrimination is also illegal when perpetrated against men as
well as women. Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner, 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998».
23. See Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir.
1981). In Parker, the court found that majority plaintiffs could establish a McDonnell
Douglas prima facie test if they could show that the "background circumstances [of the
case] support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discrimi
nates against the majority." Id.
24. Tappe, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 182.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 183 (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Adarand v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995».
28. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
29. Tappe, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
30. Id.
31. [d.
32. Id. at 184.
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to establish the fourth prong because if they were enough that
"would mean that employees would always have a prima facie case
of employment discrimination whenever they lost their jobs. "33
Tappe's claims were dismissed because he had "failed to allege
that he was terminated 'under circumstances giving rise to an infer
ence of discrimination."'34 He was, however, given leave to amend,
which he promptly did. Tappe's second complaint35 [hereinafter
Tappe II] was sufficient to survive defendant's 12(b)(6) motion. 36
In his amended complaint, Tappe made two additional allegations
which the court held would raise an inference of discrimination.
First, Tappe claimed that he "performed his job better than anyone
in the group."37 According to the court, this fact alone would have
been enough to support his allegation of discrimination because
"while employers who impermissibly rely on a protected character
istic may fire their best employee (and him alone), employers moti
vated by profit or other legitimate reasons do not."38 Tappe's
second addition was a claim that he had been fired because Alli
ance was afraid that one of the other members of the group would
bring suit for discrimination if they were fired. 39 The court said that
this too would, by itself, "qualify as unlawful discrimination" be
cause while the "typical Title VII case or claim involves impermissi
ble animus or stereotyping," Title VII is violated whenever an
employee is treated "differently 'because of' the person's race, sex,
or other protected characteristic."40
Thus, Wayne Tappe survived dismissal on the pleadings and
will have his day in court. On one level, the question this Note will
pursue is a simple one: Has Wayne Tappe been discriminated
against in a way that Title VII ought to recognize? Or is the result
in some way a perversion of the intent of Title VII, a trivialization
of the great purpose of the 1964 Civil Rights Act? Would the draft
ers of Title VII have wanted the law they crafted to be used in this
way?
Of course, asking the question in this way implies its own an
swer. There are, however, deeper issues involved. The result in
33.
34.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 185 (quoting Farias v. Instructional Sys. Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 98 (2001)).

35. Tappe v. Alliance Capital Mgmt., 198 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) [here
inafter Tappe II].
36. Id. at 370 (denying defendant's motion).
37. Id. at 376 (emphasis omitted).
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Tappe reflects a deep divide within American society; it is part of
the larger argument over affirmative action that once again recently
found itself before the Supreme Court. 41 In fact, the Tappe deci
sion is directly traceable to the argument over affirmative action
that has taken place within the Supreme Court itself over the last
thirty years. In 1976 the Supreme Court saw its first 'reverse dis
crimination' case under Title VII,42 and decided that Title VII's
"terms are not limited to discrimination against members of any
particular race."43 Then in 1979, the Court decided United Steel
workers of America v. Weber,44 which said that Title VII did not
prohibit affirmative action in the private workplace. 45 At that mo
ment a conflict was born: how can we reconcile the view that Title
VII must protect all persons equally with the notion that one may
engage in private affirmative action, i.e., that we may treat some
persons differently than others? This Note will argue that this con
flict can be reconciled by recognizing that, while Title VII protects
persons of all races, it need not protect all persons equally and that
to hold that Title VII must protect all persons under precisely equal
standards undermines Congress' purpose in passing Title VII in the
first place.
II.

WHAT IS DISCRIMINATION? A BRIEF REMINDER OF THE
HISTORY OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN AMERICA

Not all forms of discrimination are the same. Racial discrimi
nation has long been recognized by the Supreme Court to be a
more invidious form of discrimination than discrimination against
women,46 which in turn the Court sees as more troubling than dis
41. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
42. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
43. [d. at 278-79.
44. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
45. /d. at 208 ("We therefore hold that Title VII's prohibition in §§ 703(a) and (d)
against racial discrimination does not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious
affirmative action plans. ").
46. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A]lllegal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect [and] ...
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."). Discrimination based on sex is
reviewed under a less rigid "intermediate scrutiny," which is described by Justice Scalia
in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,572 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
there must be some "important governmental objective" to justify the discrimination
and the "discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement
of those [the government's] objectives.").
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crimination based on disability.47 Until only fifteen years ago, the
Court recognized a difference between government action designed
to oppress minorities and government action intended to remedy
the effects of past unlawful discrimination. 48 Thus, not all forms of
discrimination are necessarily equal in the eyes of the law. This is
why it makes sense to ask whether all forms of racial discrimination
under Title VII are equivalent, and whether they ought to be
treated the same under law.
As every student of American history knows, the "brunt of the
burden of racial discrimination" in this country has been borne by
African Americans. 49 But to say that African Americans have
borne the brunt of racial discrimination in America is to minimize
and dismiss the enormity of the racial oppression inflicted on blacks
in this nation. First brought over as slaves, deprived of home, fam
ily and identity, black Americans spent two hundred and forty-four
years50 being worked as one would work oxen. They were, in the
eyes of the law, mere chattel, property to be owned by any white
man with enough money to buy. After the· Constitution was
adopted, the status of blacks changed slightly: officially recognized
at last,51 albeit not explicitly, they were now something slightly
more than property, and something significantly less than persons.
They were three-fifths persons, and their numbers as such were
used simply to empower those who enslaved them. 52 Then came
Emancipation, and after the failure of Reconstruction-a failure
brought about by the angry resistance of white men and the politi
cal compromises53 of the powerful-followed another century or so
47. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 357 (2001) (holding that the disabled
are entitled to only the most lenient "rational basis" scrutiny).
48. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 551 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("Today, for the first time, a majority of this Court has adopted strict scru
tiny as its standard of Equal Protection Clause review of race-conscious remedial
measures. ").
49. See 110 CONGo REC. H1599 (1964) (comment of Rep. Minish during debate
over passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 527 (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("It is plainly true that in our society blacks have suffered discrimination
immeasurably greater than any directed at other racial groups.").
50. The first ship bringing black slaves to the Colonies arrived in Jamestown, Vir
ginia, in 1619. Robert D. Loevy, Introduction to THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964: THE
PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 1 (Robert D. Loevy ed.,
1997). Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863. Id.
at 3.
51. Jefferson's original condemnation of slavery was deleted from the Declara
tion of Independence so as not to lose southern support for the Revolution. Id. at 2.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 3-4. The author discusses the compromise of 1876 when, in exchange
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of legalized segregation 54 and oppression. 55 Once again, blacks
were 'free' only to the extent that whites allowed them to be free.
It was in this period, the period of Jim Crow, that white racism
was most perfidious and least excusable-where African Ameri
cans, now nominally free, were forced to abide a systematic, humili
ating, and deadly56 imposition of racial subjugation by both their
fellow private citizens and by the government ostensibly formed to
uphold the rights of man. 57
The Supreme Court of the United States was itself the catalyst
for the spread and entrenchment of Jim Crow. In the Civil Rights
Cases, the Court said that the 14th Amendment did not extend to
the acts of private citizens.58 The result of the decision was to allow
private individuals to "not only discriminate against blacks but ...
actually terrorize them, confident in the knowledge that the power
of the United States Government ... would not be used to punish
them. "59 So long as the States themselves did not discriminate, the
for an agreement that Rutherford B. Hayes would be determined the winner of the
disputed election of 1876, Republicans agreed to remove all Union troops from the
South. Thus, Reconstruction came to an end. [d.
54. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also Loevy, supra note 50, at 8
("The end result of the Civil Rights Cases ... was to give white individuals almost
complete license, including lynching and murder, to personally enforce racial segrega
tion, all of it done without any sense that there would ever be any official punish
ment."). See also 110 CONGo REC. H1541 (1964) (statement of Rep. Lindsay: "There
are instances where the coercive arm of the State has been applied to encourage or to
support policies of commercial segregation. . .. They have intimidated, coerced, and
arrested those engaged in peaceful picketing to obtain equal rights ....").
55. Loevy, supra note 50, at 8 ("[M]urders and assassinations remained an ever
present personal technique for frightening southern blacks into submission to white
supremacy.").
56. See PHILIP PERLMUTTER, DIVIDED WE FALL: A HISTORY OF ETHNIC, RELIG·
IOUS, AND RACIAL PREJUDICE IN AMERICA 151 (1992). The emergence of the Ku Klux
Klan and other secret societies after the Civil War led to widespread violence against
African Americans:
Blacks were subjected to floggings, house burnings, mutilations, shootings,
stabbings, and hangings. In Louisiana, in 1868, 2,000 were killed or wounded
in just a few weeks; in Florida, in a single county, more than 150 were mur
dered in a few months; and in Texas, murders became "so common as to
render it impossible to keep accurate accounts of them."
/d.

57. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) ( "[T]hat all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. - That to
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed ....").
58. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("Individual invasion of indi
vidual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.").
59. Loevy, supra note 50, at 7. See also MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW
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14th Amendment provided no protection for blacks from the ra
cism of whites. Thus, "[b]y the early 1890's a black was lynched in
the South an average of every three days. "60 Whites made up the
juries, and white police officers, "committed ... to the doctrine of
white supremacy," were free to suppress their black neighbors
through violence, confident that no one would do anything to stop
or punish them. 61
Plessy v. Ferguson became the law of the land in 1896 and seg
regation blossomed throughout the South. 62 Although segregation
had long been the norm,63 it now had been challenged in court and
had withstood the challenge. By the beginning of the twentieth
century, laws banning interracial marriage and mandating separate
facilities had appeared in almost every possible incarnation. 64 There
were the infamous separate drinking fountains and bathrooms,65
but there were also laws mandating "segregated schools, trains,
streetcars, hotels, barbershops, restaurants, and theaters. "66 Blacks
had different hospitals and mental hospitals, different prisons, dif
ferent homes for the disabled. 67 "In New Orleans, prostitutes were
separated by race."68 In Atlanta courts, black witnesses were not
allowed to swear on the same Bible as white witnesses. 69 Even in
AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST
BROWN SOUTH 11-17 (1987) (discussing the Supreme Court's refusal to enforce the Ku
Klux Klan Act).
60. Loevy, supra note 50, at 7. See also RICHARD WORMSER, THE RISE AND
FALL OF JIM CROW 74 (2003) (Lynchings increased from 113 a year in 1891 to 134 in
1894. "Until 1905, more than one hundred men and women were lynched every year
but one.").
61. Loevy, supra note 50, at 8 ("Another part of the system of black oppression
was 'the free white jury that will never convict."'). See also BELKNAP, supra note 59, at
25 (In May of 1947, a jury in Greenville, South Carolina acquitted thirty-one white men
of having lynched a black man, "despite the fact that the FBI had obtained confessions
from twenty-six of the defendants.").
62. See supra notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text.
63. See PERLMUTTER, supra note 56, at 151 (Soon after the end of the Civil War,
"'Black Codes' multiplied denying Blacks the right to own weapons, serve on juries,
purchase or lease property, be idle, or behave disrespectfully toward Whites.").
64. ALDON MORRIS, CENTURlES OF BLACK PROTEST: ITs SIGNIFICANCE FOR
AMERICA AND THE WORLD, RACE IN AMERICA, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 41
(Hebert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993). In fact, interracial marriages had been
outlawed in at least seven of the original thirteen colonies as early as 1662. See PERL
MUTTER, supra note 56, at 74.
65. WORMSER, supra note 60, at 105.
66. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 41.
67. WORMSER, supra note 60, at 105.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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death, blacks and white were interred in separate cemeteriesJo
Significantly, Jim Crow served to push African Americans into
separate and unequal portions of the labor market. 71 Black work
ers were restricted in the occupations they could undertake, gener
ally being forced into low wage manual labor and prevented from
joining skilled crafts and trades by the discrimination of labor un
ions.72 The only option left to many blacks was that of sharecrop
ping, exchanging their labor for a portion of a landlord's cropsJ3
This exclusion from skilled trades actually caused the numbers of
skilled African-American workers in the South to decline by almost
90% in the post-Civil War eraJ4
Jim Crow was a pervasive system that was initiated and de
signed to ensure white domination in American societyJ5 Under
Jim Crow, black Americans were prevented from exercising their
votes in numerous ways, including poll taxes, literacy tests, and
property requirementsJ6 When these quasi-legal barriers failed to
work, whites resorted to the "central weapon ... in the struggle for
white domination," violence. 77 It is difficult to overstate the level
of violence that whites, particularly in the South, were willing to
unleash on blacks who insisted on attempting to vote, organize, im
prove their lot, and gain equality. The Ku Klux Klan "beat,
whipped and murdered thousands, and terrorized tens of thousands
to prevent them from voting. "78 The violence was widespread and
systernic;79 and, when not actually engaging in the violence them
selves,80 white police did little or nothing to stop the violence'.81
70. Id, It is important to note that while segregation reached its pinnacle in the
South, it began in the North even before slavery had been abolished. PERLMUlTER,
supra note 56, at 142.
71. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 41-42.
72. Id.
73. WORMSER, supra note 60, at 36.
74. PERLMUlTER, supra note 56, at 173 ("[I]n the South at the close of the Civil
War, 100,000 out of 125,000 artisans and craftsmen were Black, but by 1900 the number
had decreased to less than 10,000. ").
75. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 41. See also BELKNAP, supra note 59, at 7 ("In
1907 Mississippi's Senator James K. Vardaman declared that every Negro in the state
would be lynched if such a slaughter were necessary to maintain white supremacy.").
76. BELKNAP, supra note 59, at 7.
77. Id.
78. WORMSER, supra note 60, at 24.
79. See, e.g., id. at 24-25, 30-31, 74, 84-87, 126-28, 130, and 168-69.
80. BELKNAP, supra note 59, at 9 ("Indeed, according to Arthur F. Raper, during
the period 1930-1933, sheriffs or their deputies planned or participated in nearly half of
all lynchings. ").
81. Id. at 8 (Belknap points out that some southern white sheriffs "courageously
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When the civil rights movement began to make serious gains in the
1950s and 1960s, white violence repeatedly met black progress. 82
Invidious discrimination was ubiquitous throughout the coun
try in 1963-1964. In the context of Title VII and the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, however, it is important to recognize that legal racial
discrimination in America was a one-way street. The evil that the
Civil Rights Act was designed to end was the evil of white discrimi
nation against other races, and in particular against blacks. This is
what the Representatives and Senators who spoke on the floor of
Congress meant when they used the term "discrimination;" it seems
only reasonable to shade our modern understanding of the term
with the inescapable reality of the history of white racism in
America.
III.

BORN IN FIRE: TITLE VII AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

Title VII, in order to be properly understood, must be ex
amined from its genesis: the heated struggle for civil rights in 1963
and 1964. 83
In 1963, when the bill which would become the 1964 Civil
Rights Act was submitted to Congress, the nation was embroiled in
a long, violent, and visible struggle over the inequities caused by
racism in America. On June 11, 1963 President Kennedy was
forced to deploy National Guard troops to the University of Ala
pama to impose a desegregation order that Alabama Governor
George Wallace had vowed to fight. 84 For months, Americans had
witnessed sweeping demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama, and
other cities throughout the South and across the country. They had
watched in April and Mayas police in Birmingham, led by Theoph
ilus Eugene "Bull" Connor,ss turned fire hoses on demonstrators,
and met resistance with batons, attack dogs and cattle prods. 86 They
had watched on Good Friday as Martin Luther King, Jr. was led to
jail for defying a court injunction forbidding more demonstra
defended black prisoners from would-be lynchers," but many more stood by and did
nothing).
82. Loevy, supra note 50, at 23 (white community reacted to the Selma bus boy
cott by bombing buildings and attacking boycotters).
83. The struggle, and the violent backlash against desegregation, did not begin in
1963. For a history of the violent repression of black southerners during the post Brown
v. Board of Education era see BELKNAP, supra note 59, at 27-52.
84. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOP
MENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 75 (1992).
85. Id. at 74.
86. Id.
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tions. 87 They had watched as nearly a thousand black children, or
ganized by the Southern Christian Leadership Council, were carted
off to jail for protesting Birmingham's segregationist policies. 88
And they had watched as racists reacted to the May 10, 1963 deseg
regation agreement of Birmingham by setting off bombs. 89
Birmingham was not the only city in the country torn by racial
strife. In April, William L. Moore, a white integrationist who had
taken it upon himself to walk from Tennessee to Mississippi to pro
test segregation, was shot dead on the road in Alabama, only a day
after beginning his walk. 90 Those who tried to finish his walk were
repeatedly arrested in order to prevent the completion of the
"Freedom Walk."91 In Baltimore, hundreds of protestors had been
arrested for demonstrating against the refusal of the owners of the
Northwood Theatre to allow black patrons onto the premises. 92 In
Greenwood, Mississippi, violence erupted in February, March and
April as white racists attempted to halt a voter registration drive by
bombing, shooting at and otherwise terrorizing workers trying to
register Leflore County's black population. 93
Later that summer there were demonstrations in the North
both in support of and in opposition to the continuing movement
for civil rights. In New York, 800 were arrested during an effort to
integrate union apprentice programs;94 in New Jersey, 128 people
were arrested for picketing a discriminatory construction site in
Elizabeth;95 in Chicago there was a series of anti-integration ac
tions, including a protest by some 4,000 whites opposed to an ordi
nance barring discrimination in housing;96 in Philadelphia, forty-six
persons were injured in fighting between protestors and police at
pickets against discrimination in city construction projects;97 again
in Philadelphia, in August, Horace and Sarah Baker, a black couple,
were prevented from occupying a home they had bought in a white
87. HARRY S. ASHMORE, HEARTS AND MINDS; THE ANATOMY OF RACISM FROM
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 351-52 (1982).
88. Id. at 352.
89. Id. at 353.
90. CiVIL RIGHTS 1960-66, at 193 (Lester A. Sobel ed., 1967) [hereinafter CIVIL
RIGHTS]'
91. Id. at 194.
92. Id. at 195.
93. Id. at 192-93 (indicating 64% of Leflore County's population of approxi
mately 45,000 was black but only 250 blacks were registered to vote).
94. Id. at 208.
95. Id. at 211.
96. Id. at 212.
97. Id. at 212, 213.
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neighborhood by a mob of angry whites who broke windows in
their house and later set it on fire;98 and in Detroit 125,000 people
participated in a city-sanctioned parade opposing discrimination. 99
All of this culminated in the August March on Washington, where
200,000 people heard Martin Luther King, Jr. give his famous "I
Have A Dream" speech. And, only a month later, the 16th Street
Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama was bombed, killing four
little girls, and rousing the disgust of blacks' and whites alike.lOo
These were only a few of the dozens, if not hundreds of incidents of
racial struggle occurring throughout the country in 1963.1 01
On the evening of June 11th, Kennedy went on national televi
sion to address the issue of racial discrimination in America. 102 In
his speech, the President reminded Americans of the founding prin
ciples of the nation: that "all men are created equal, and the rights
of every man are diminished when the rights of one man are
threatened. "103 Kennedy told the country that he was sending pro
posed legislation to Congress to address some of the issues raised
by demonstrators, including protecting the right to vote, ending seg
regation in the public schools, and dismantling the pervasive Jim
Crow laws of the South. The President asked white Americans to
imagine' themselves constricted by the effects of the kind of perva
sive discrimination inflicted on blacks:
If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a
restaurant open to the public; if he cannot send his children to
the best public schools available; if he cannot vote for the public
officials who represent him; if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full
and free life which all of us want, then who among us would be
content to have the color of his skin changed and stand in his
place?104

He reminded the country that blacks had been freed from slav
ery one hundred years prior to his speech that night, and yet still
98.
99.

[d. at 213.
[d. at 214.

100. BELKNAP, supra note 59, at 121.
101. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 90, at 168-214; BELKNAP, supra note 59,
at 119 ("During 1963 ten persons died in circumstances directly related to racial pro
tests, and there were at least thirty-five bombings in the South.").
102. President's Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil
Rights, 237 PUB. PAPERS 468 (June 11, 1963).
103.
104.

[d.
[d. at 469.
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were not free "from social and economic oppression. "105
On June 19th, the President sent his proposed legislation to
Congress. 106 The text of the bill, to be called the "Civil Rights Act
of 1963" was divided into eight Titles, each of which dealt with a
separate issue, including voting rights, discrimination in public ac
commodations, desegregation of public schools, and, under Title
VII of the proposed act, the establishment of a Commission on
Equal Employment Opportunity.107 Unfortunately, Congress did
not take up formal debate on the legislation until January of 1964,
so President Kennedy would not live to see his legislation make its
way through Congress. lOS
On January 31, 1964, Congressman Madden introduced Reso
lution 616, which called for the House to consider as a body for ten
hours of debate what had become H.R. 7152, "The Civil Rights Act
of 1963."109 It is clear from Mr. Madden's introduction of the Act
to the House that the Act and all its Titles were intended to work
together in order to secure full civil rights for blacks.1 lO Congress
man Madden was also quite clear about whom the employment
provision of the bill was designed to help. In criticizing a "watered
down" 1960 civil rights bill, Madden pointed out that the bill "failed
to make effective provisions for employment to improve the unem
ployment situation as it pertained to Negroes."l11 "In 1947 to 1951,
the rate of unemployment for Negro men and women was 50 per
cent more than it was for whites."112 Even the bill's opponents in
the House conceded that the legislation was intended to improve.
the lives of black Americans.1 13 In fact, a reading of the debate on
the bill in the House leaves absolutely no doubt in the reader's
mind: the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed and implemented
in response to the growing sense of "moral outrage"114 in the coun
105. Id. Later that night, Medgar Evers, a leader of the Mississippi NAACP, was
gunned down outside his house. ASHMORE, supra note 87, at 375.
106. CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 90, at 175.
107. 237 PUB. PAPERS at 470.
108. CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 90, at 178.
109. 110 CONGo REC. H1511 (1964) (statement of Rep. Madden).
110. Id. at H1512.
111. Id.
112. /d. As was pointed out earlier, black unemployment has consistently re
mained nearly double that of whites over the last forty years. See infra notes 150-152
and accompanying text.
113. 110 CONGo REC. H1515 (1964) (comments of Rep. Colmer, in stating his be
lief that the bill was unconstitutional: "Of course, the advocates of this legislation are in
favor of helping the Negro. So am I ....").
114. 110 CONGo REC. H1521 (1964) (comments of Rep. Cellar).
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try regarding discrimination against African Americans. 115 As
Congressman Minish of New Jersey succinctly put it: "No one can
deny that Negroes receive the brunt of the burden of discrimina
tion."116 Or, more eloquently, the words of Congressman Libonati
of Illinois:
The loyalty of the American Negro belongs to no other flag. His
lineage can be traced to no other nation. He was a captured
human being. Yet, 100 years after his emancipation throughout
the land he is denied the rights of citizenship and the opportuni
ties of education, employment, and social status enjoyed by his
fellow Americans. We can no longer tolerate this condition.1 17

In particular, there was no doubt that the benefits of Title VII
were designed to improve the economic plight of blacks.l1S
There was no sense in the debates in either the House or the
Senate that whites were in need of protection from discrimination,
because whites were not suffering from discrimination. 119 The bill
as understood by its advocates in the House-those who voted it
into law-was as a remedial measure 120 designed to begin the pro
cess of overturning a century's worth of Jim CroW. 121 Both sides in
115. 110 CONGo REc. H1539 (1964) (comments of Rep. Rodino: "For too long
Negroes in America have been denied that most fundamental democratic right, the
right to vote. . .. And for too long Negroes in America have been denied the equal
opportunity to jobs.... These wrongs cry out for redress."). See also H.R. REP. No.
88-914, at 2393 (1964). "Most glaring ... is the discrimination against Negroes," the
Report stated. "Today, more than 100 years after their formal emancipation, Ne
groes ... are by virtue of one or another type of discrimination not accorded the rights,
privileges, and opportunities which are considered to be, and must be, the birthright of
all citizens." [d.
116. 110 CONGo REc. H1599 (1964) (statement of Rep. Minish).
117. [d. (statement of Rep. Libonati).
118. See, e.g., 110 CONGo REc. H1539 (1964) (comments of Rep. Rodino: "[F]or
too long Negroes in America have been denied equal opportunity to jobs."); 110 CONGo
REc. H1540 (1964) (comments of Rep. 10elson: "The equal employment features of the
bill will serve to give minority groups the economic advantages without which the other
advantages would be meaningless."); 110 CONGo REc. H1583 (1964) (comments of Rep.
Berry: "H.R. 7152 deals partially with civil rights, but the bulk of the bill deals with
economic rights and social rights for the Negro.").
119. See 110 CONGo REc. H2728 (1964) (amendment by Rep. Dowdy to include a
prohibition against discrimination towards Caucasian, white and Protestant Americans
was rejected by a voice vote).
120. See 110 CONGo REc. H1628 (1964) (comments of Rep. Halpern: "For the
first time since the Civil War the American People as a whole have come to realize the
desperate plight of the Negro, the basic justice of his demands, and the need for reme
dial action. ").
121. See 110 CONGo REC. H1592 (1964) (comments of Rep. Corman: "A hundred
years ago, we took the Negro out of the marketplace as a commodity. It is time we put
him back in the marketplace as a customer."); 110 CONGo REc. H1517 (1964) (com
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the debate understood that the situation as it was would not remain
stable, and that in order to secure equal rights for blacks, whites
would have to sacrifice some of the privileges they enjoyed because
of the history of repression and segregation. 122 But, as the majority
declared, these sacrifices were necessary in order to redress the in
justices caused by the repression and segregation of black Ameri
cans.123 It was just as clear to these members of Congress that the
sacrifices were acceptable in the effort to balance the scales of jus
tice, and that in the end this redressing of grievances and balancing
of rights would benefit all Americans, black and white, by securing
the fruits of freedom for al1. 124
The mood of the debate on the Senate floor was much more
contentious than that in the House; however, there are repeated
references in the debates by members of both sides which make it
very clear that the Senate, too, believed Title VII was primarily in
tended to benefit African Americans,125 that employment discrimi
nation against whites was simply non-existent,126 and that the Act
ments of Rep. Cellar: "[W]hat we are considering this day in effect is a bill on a petition
in the language of our Constitution for a redress of grievances. The grievances are real
and genuine, the proof is in, the gathering of evidence has gone on for over a
century.").
122. See 110 CONGo REC. H1546 (1964) (comments of Rep. Watson: "1 believe in
respecting the rights of the minorities as much as any man or woman in this body. But
at the same time, 1 believe in respecting the rights of the majority. You cannot give one
excessive rights without in turn trampling upon the rights of others.").
123. 110 CONG REc. H1517 (1964) (comments of Rep. Celler: "1 am not unaware
of the price that must be paid by some for the advance of the cause of civil rights .... 1
wish truly that it could be otherwise, but unfortunately, it cannot.").
124. See 110 CONGo REc. H1625-26 (1964). According to Rep. Rooney:
The passage of this bill will not only insure the Negro of his rightful place in
American society, but it will also lay to rest many of the unfounded fears
which have plagued our national life. We cannot endure, as a free nation, if
we are afraid to abide by the concepts of freedom which caused this country to
be founded.
Id. See also 110 CONGo REc. H1512 (1964) (comments of Rep. Celler: "[Every Ameri
can citizen] should realize that freedom for minorities is indivisible with freedom for the
majority and that unless everyone enjoys freedom, no one's freedom is secure.").
125. 110 CONGo REC. S7253 (1964) (comment of Sen. Ervin: "Why is it necessary
to create a new Federal bureaucracy to help 895,000 nonwhites get jobs while the Con
gress does not concern itself about the 3,629,000 unemployed whites ... ?").
126. [d. (colloquy between Senators Ervin and Case: Sen. Case: "[T]he rate for
Negro unemployment is more than two times as great as for white. The difference
indicates something." Sen. Ervin: "Does the Senator contend that any of these
3,629,000 white [unemployed] individuals denied employment because of their race or
color?" Sen. Case then suggested that Sen. Ervin's question was frivolous. Sen. Ervin
responded: "Does the Senator from New Jersey think it is frivolous to those 3,629,000
white individuals without jobs?" Sen. Case responded: "The question was whether
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itself was designed to remedy the "injustices suffered by American
Negroes and other minority groups"127 over the previous three hun
dred years of slavery and segregation. 128 What is more, in his intro
duction of Title VII to the floor of the Senate, Senator Case made it
quite plain that Title VII was not only designed to bring down the
level of black unemployment,129 it was also designed to bring Afri
can Americans into the professions.13° He stated, "[a]lmost one
half of the white employees of the country are in white-collar jobs,"
but "among [nonwhites], service workers and blue-collar workers
constitute approximately three-fourths of the total number ... who
are employed. "131
Finally, it must be said that the opposition in the Senate and
the House was not concerned with voluntary affirmative action or
diversity in the workplace; the opposition believed that the bill
would remove from employers entirely the right to decide whom to
hire and whom to fire.132 The opposition believed that the Act was
being pushed by "militant groups"133 and that the problems facing
African Americans were entirely their own fault. 134 One opponent
stated, "Negroes can consider themselves first class citizens if they
earn the right to become so, ... laws passed by the Congress cannot
provide the Negro with the future he wants, ... the answer to the
those whites were unemployed because of discrimination based on their white color.
That was a frivolous question. I shall be glad to answer any serious question.").
127. 110 CONGo REC. Sl1,053 (1964) (comments of Sen. Humphrey).
128. 110 CONGo REC. S7247 (1964) (comments of Sen. Case: "I find it hard to
believe that anyone in his heart of hearts can deny that injustice and suppression have
been the lot of generations of Negro Americans.").
129. 110 CONGo REC. S7240 (comments of Sen. Case: "A fair chance for a decent
job-who cannot understand this-for freedom without the means of utilizing and en
joying it is an empty thing.").
130. 110 CONGo REc. S7241 (comments of Sen. Case).
131. [d. In addition, Senator Case discussed income disparities, pointing out that
black workers median income was slightly more than half that of white workers, and
that a nonwhite man with a college education was likely to earn less over a lifetime than
a white with only an eighth grade education. [d.
132. See 110 CONGo REC. S7074 (1964) (comments of Sen. Stennis); 110 CONGo
REC. H1618 (1964) (comments of Rep. Abernethy); 110 CONGo REC. H1645 (1964)
(comments of Rep. Alger).
133. 110 CONGo REC. S7022 (1964) (comments of Sen. Holland).
134. 110 CONGo REC. S7020 (1964) (comments of Sen. Holland: "I think the
trouble is that no one tells the Negro that he's responsible for himself-being unem
ployed.") (citation omitted). See also 110 CONGo REC. H1621 (1964) (comments of
Rep. Abernethy: "The present Negro leadership blames every ill on racial discrimina
tion. Every Negro failure, every Negro fault . . . is blamed on the white man's
discrimination ....").
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Negro's future is hard work ...."135 Other opponents believed that
there were no racial problems at a11. 136 The Senators and Congress
men who eventually voted against the Act were terrified of the
"Federal Government ... dictat[ing] which employees [a small busi
nessman] could promote.· Federal agents would be looking over his
shoulder all the time. "137 As with every other step in the struggle
for civil rights, those intent on maintaining white supremacy, even
those in government, resisted any infringement of their domination
and were willing to go to almost any length to maintain it. 138
That the fears of government infringement on the privacy of all
Americans through the Civil Rights Act have not come to pass goes
without saying, and yet statements made by supporters of the Act
to mollify these frankly racist ravings have, in the end, been used by
opponents of Title VII to deny the right of employers to hire and
fire and promote whom they wish.139 This sort of reading not only
violates the spirit of Title VII, it grants too much power to those
who opposed the Act-those who worked tirelessly against the
Act's passage and who would likely never have voted for any kind
of civil rights act, no matter how attenuated.
In the end, the report issued to the House, H.R. 914, summed
up the purposes of the Act: "Today, more than 100 years after their
formal emancipation, Negroes, who make up over 10 percent of our
population, are by virtue of . . . discrimination not afforded the
rights, privileges, and opportunities which are considered to be, and
must be, the birthright of all citizens."14o Part of the virtue of the
Act, according to the report, was that it would do more than deal
with "the most troublesome problems" of discrimination, it would
135. 110 CONGo REC. S7020 (1964) (comments of Sen. Holland).
136. See 110 CONGo REC. H1537 (1964) (comments of Rep. Whitener); see also
110 CONGo REC. H1546 (1964) (comments of Rep. Watson).
137. 110 CONGo REC. S7074 (1964) (comments of Sen. Stennis).
138. In 1958, Governor Faubus of Arkansas closed the state's public schools
rather than allow integration to go forward. DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS:
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFER
ENCE 119 (1988). In 1960, Southern Senators initiated a round-the-clock filibuster to
defeat the civil rights bill of that year. See CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 90, at 23 ("In
preparation for the filibuster, 40 cots had been moved into the Senate offices and com
mittee rooms for the use of Senators unable to go home to sleep for days at a stretch.").
139. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America V. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,233 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist uses speeches by Senators Lindsay and
Minish-given in an attempt to assuage the extremist fears of Southern Senators that
the Federal government would be "looking over [every employers] shoulder" and forc
ing them to hire underqualified blacks-to support his contention that any racial pref
erence would be illegal. Id.
140. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 2393 (1964).
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also "create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary . . . resolu
tion."141 And in an Additional View Report, several Congressmen
noted that the problems of unemployment and poverty caused by
discrimination were having broad, invidious effects on the African
American community, including a higher infant mortality rate,
shorter life expectancy, and a disincentive to achieve in education
or the workplace. 142 All this contributed to "deny[ing] to the Na
tion the full benefit of the skills, intelligence, cultural endeavor, and
general excellence which the Negro will contribute if afforded the
rights of first-class citizenship."143
The legislative history, especially when viewed in the context
of the larger social and historical movements which brought about
the legislation in the first place, supports the view that Title VII was
directed at improving the position of African Americans in order to
benefit all of America.
IV.

THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN
THE WORKPLACE

The 1964 Civil Rights Act was enacted forty years ago as an
enormous omnibus piece of legislation designed to eliminate the
most egregious forms of discrimination facing black Americans. Ti
tle VII was included as part of that legislation because, as President
Kennedy himself said: "There is little value in a Negro's obtaining
the right to be admitted to hotels and restaurants if he has no cash
in his pocket and no job."144 Or, as Senator Humphrey said in his
remarks on the Senate floor, the legislation was needed to "open
employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have
been traditionally closed to them."145 So it seems reasonable to
ask, forty years later, whether Title VII has opened employment
opportunities for black Americans in occupations that had been tra
ditionally closed to them. In attempting to answer that question,
this Note examines employment figures in one employment area
traditionally closed to African Americans: the Law.
There is some good news to tell: from 1983 to 2000, the per
centage of black lawyers in America more than doubled. The bad
news is that in 1983, only 2.6% of all lawyers in America were Afri
141.
142.
143.

[d.
[d. at 2514-15.
[d.

144.
145.

109
110

CONGo
CONGo

REC. Sll,159 (1963).
REc. S6548 (1964) (comment by Sen. Humphrey).
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can American. In 2000, the percentage had risen to 5.4%.146 (Afri
can Americans make-up approximately 11.3% of the general
American workforce).147 To understand precisely what these num
bers mean, it is necessary to look at the larger economic picture for
black Americans in relation to their white counterparts. As of
1999, the median household income in the United States was
$40,816; for whites the figure was $42,504, while for black Ameri
cans the median household income was just $27,910.1 48 And while
11.8% of all Americans were living below the poverty line in 1999,
only 9.8% of whites were, while nearly a fourth of all African
Americans, or 23.6%, were living below the poverty line.149
Part of the income disparity is clearly due to the continuing
divergence in unemployment between blacks and whites in this
country. In 1968, the unemployment rate for white males was
3.0%, while that for "non-white" males (the only other racial cate
gory recognized by the census at the time) was more than double, at
7.1 %.1 50 In 1980, whites were unemployed at a rate of 6.3%; blacks
at 14.3%-again more than double the figure for whites. 151 In
2000, unemployment had gone down for both groups, but while
white unemployment had dropped to 3.5%, black unemployment
was at 7.6%.152 The pattern of unemployment is clear-no matter
how well or how poorly the economy is doing, black workers will be
unemployed at roughly twice the rate of white workers.
Another part of the income disparity is bound to the kinds of
jobs generally held by black workers in comparison to their white
counterparts. For example, in 1993 (the latest occupation figures
available),153 when blacks made up 10.2% of the workforce, the
census found there were 529,000 financial managers (Wayne
Tappe's job) in the country.1 54 Of these, only 4.4% were black.155
Of the 605,000 doctors, only 3.7% were black. 156 And of the
146. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
380 (2001) [hereinafter CENSUS 2001].

ABSTRACf OF THE UNITED

STATES

147. Id.
148. Id. at 433.
149. Id. at 442.
150. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
STATES (1970).
151. CENSUS 2001, supra note 146, at 386.
152. Id.
153. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
STATES (1994).
154. Id. at 407.
155. /d.
156. Id.

ABSTRACf OF THE UNITED

ABSTRACf OF THE UNITED
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769,000 computer systems analysts in the nation, just 5.8% were
black.ls7
These figures demonstrate that in highly-skilled professions
blacks are, as a percentage of the workforce in relation to their
numbers in the general population, severely under-represented. At
the other end of the spectrum, in traditionally low and un-skilled
jobs, blacks are seriously over-represented. For example, of the
nearly two million cooks in the nation, almost 20% were black,1s8
Of the three million persons employed in "cleaning and building
service occupations" (in other words, janitors and maids), 22.4%
were black. ls9 And over 30% of the nearly two million nursing
aides, orderlies and attendants in 1993 were African American,160
It is into this picture that one must place the numbers of black
lawyers in America. Clearly, things have improved. In 2000, 5.4%
of the lawyers in the country were black. 161 At a few of the coun
try's largest law firms, the percentage is higher-in 2000, at two
large law firms, 7.3% of the associates were black, fully 50% above
the national average,162 However, after that 7.3%, the numbers
drop and the percentage of black associates among all associates at
all large law firms combined is only 4.1 %, 20% below the national
average of all black lawyers,163 And of the partners at all large law
firms, 96.1 % are white, while only 1.9% are black,164
In terms of erasing the lingering effects of segregation, then,
the legal profession has a long way to go. And while it is difficult, if
not impossible, to determine how much of the growth that there has
been in the number of black lawyers has been due to the positive
effects of Title VII and other anti-discrimination legislation, it is
clear that Title VII and its brethren have not yet fulfilled their re
medial purpose of making black Americans equal players in the
employment marketplace.
157. Id. These same statistics reveal that African Americans comprised just 3.1 %
of architects, 3.7% of engineers, 4.8% of university professors, and held only 6.2% of all
executive, administrative and managerial positions in the country. Id.
158. CENSUS 2001, supra note 146, at 409. Interestingly, only 3.8% of the bar
tenders and 4.6% of the waiters were black. Id.
159. ld.
160. Id. In addition, 14.9% of laborers, 26.8% of the postal clerks, and 27.5% of
the nations barbers were black. Id.
161. Id.
162. Brian Zabcik, Measuring Up (And Down), THE MINORITY LAW JOURNAL,
Spring, 2002, available at http://www.minoritylawjournal.comlspring02/texts/measuring.
html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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HISTORICALLY INFORMED JURISPRUDENCE: UNITED

STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA V. WEBER

The central contextual reading of Title VII was and remains
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.165 Although decided
nearly a quarter of a century ago, the Supreme Court's decision in
Weber remains controversial. 166 It also remains the law of the land,
although some commentators call for it to be overturned.1 67 Con
sidering the current makeup of the Supreme Court, these commen
tators may yet see their wish come true. However, it is not difficult
to argue that the Weber court was right-when read in its proper
context, Title VII not only allows for but encourages affirmative
action in the workplace. Weber's detractors, exemplified by the an
gry dissent penned by then Associate Justice William Rehnquist,
have simply blinded themselves to the true purpose and intent of
Congress in enacting Title VII.
The facts of Weber are as follows: in 1974, United Steelworkers
of America entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
Weber's employer, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.1 68 As part
of this agreement, Kaiser instituted a new training program in an
effort to promote more black workers as craftworkers, an area of
Kaiser which, before the program was instituted, was less than 2 %
black at the Gramercy, Louisiana plant where Weber was em
ployed.1 69 The training program earmarked 50% of the available
spots for black workers pO Weber was a white worker at the Gra
mercy plant who was denied a place in the craftwork training pro
gram despite the fact that he was a more senior employee than all
of the black employees selected.1 71 Thereafter, Weber brought suit
alleging that the affirmative action program violated § 703(a) of Ti
165. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Although Weber was concerned with formal affirmative
action programs, the analysis of the majority demonstrates the Court's understanding of
the history and purposes of Title VII in a manner that is consonant with the purposes of
this Note.
166. See, e.g., Ken Feagins, Affirmative Action or the Same Sin?, 67 DENV. U.L.
REV. 421,434 (1990). See also Book Note, Affirmative Action Anonymous, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 967,969-72 (1991) (reviewing MELVIN UROFSKY, A CONFLICT OF RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION) [hereinafter Affirmative Action
Anonymous].
167. See, e.g., Feagins, supra note 166, at 440; Affirmative Action Anonymous,
supra note 166, at 971.
168. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-98.
169. Id. at 198.
170. /d.
171. Id. at 199.
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tIe VIIl72 by promoting junior employees into the training program
over more senior employees based solely on their race. 173 The two
lower courts found that the affirmative action program was racially
discriminatory, the Fifth Circuit holding that "all employment pref
erences based upon race, including those preferences incidental to
bona fide affirmative action plans, violated Title VII's prohibition
against racial discrimination in employment. "174
Justice Brennan's majority opinion relied heavily on "the back
ground of the legislative history of Title VII and the historical con
text from which the Act arose."175 This is because the statute itself,
if "literally constructed," appears to prohibit all forms of racial dis
crimination in employmentP6 The question the Court wanted to
ask, is why did Congress intend to eliminate discrimination from
the workplace? As we have seen, Title VII, indeed all of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, is a remedial statute-that is, it was designed
and intended to remedy a wrong. l77 The Court recognized that the
wrong Congress was trying to remedy with Title VII was "the plight
of the Negro in our economy."178
The majority's view of the statute seems inescapable when one
considers the purposes of the Civil Rights Act itself, which was "the
integration of blacks into the mainstream of American society."179
For instance, Title II of the Act, a provision almost as controversial
in the Congressional debates as Title VII, prohibited owners of res
172. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (2004).
173. Weber, 443 U.S. at 199.
174. Id. at 200.
175. Id. at 201.
176. Id. The section of the statute regarding illegal employment practices, says
that
lilt shall be an unlawful unemployment practice for an employer-(l) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (2004). See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Inter
pretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1489 (1987) ("It is ... plausible to interpret the
antidiscrimination rule to penalize only discrimination which is invidious, for the term
'discrimination' in common usage means something more than just different
treatment. ").
177. See ASHMORE, supra note 87.
178. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202 (citing the remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
179. Id.
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taurants, hotels and other "public accommodations" from discrimi
nating against people on the basis of color.1 80 Title I was designed
to eliminate discrimination in voting,181 while Title IV codified the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education 182 out
lawing segregation in schools. I83 All of the provisions of the 1964
Civil Rights Act were designed and implemented to prevent forms
of discrimination that were being used by whites against blacks, in
order to maintain white supremacy. The provisions were passed as
a group in order to effect the broadest, most complete change in the
quality of life for black Americans possible. 184 As eloquently de
scribed in an Additional Views report accompanying the House Re
port, the purposes of the Civil Rights Act were clear:
More than a hundred years have elapsed since the Negro has
been freed from the bonds of slavery. Yet, to this day, the Negro
continues to bear the burdens of a race under the traces of servi
tude. In employment, education, public service, amusement,
housing and citizenship, the Negro has faced the barrier of racial
inequality. In [the] titles of this legislation, we have sought to
fashion workable tools to correct this inequity.I85

The titles of the Act were therefore designed to work together
in order to eliminate these burdens of racism. As the Weber Court
said: "Congress recognized that [the integration of blacks into
mainstream American society] would not be possible unless blacks
were able to secure jobs which have a future."186 Or, put more
bluntly: "There is little value in a Negro's obtaining the right to be
admitted to hotels and restaurants if he has no cash in his pocket
and no job."187 Viewed in this light-that Title VII was part of a
larger package of laws intended to end a century of continuous and
systematic discrimination directed against blacks by whites intent
on maintaining white supremacy after emancipation-it became in
180.

110 CONGo REc. H1511 (1964) (statement of Rep. Madden).

181.

[d.

182. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
183. 110 CONGo REc. H1511 (1964) (statement of Rep. Madden).
184. 110 CONGo REc. H1529 (1964) (comments of Rep. McCulloch: "Hundreds of
thousands of citizens are denied the basic right to vote. Thousands of school districts
remain segregated. Decent hotel and eating accommodations frequently lie hundreds
of miles apart for the Negro traveler.").
185. 914 H.R. 2393.
186. United Steelworkers of America V. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979)
(quoting remarks of Sen. Clark) (internal quotes omitted).
187. [d. at 203 (quoting President Kennedy's introductory remarks to the Civil
Rights Act in 1963).
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cumbent upon the Court to look beyond "the letter of the statute"
to find what was "within its spirit [and] within the intention of its
makers."188 Additionally, when the Court looked to the intention
of Title VII's makers in this way, it said that to interpret Title VII to
forbid "all race-conscious affirmative action would bring about an
end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute...."189
The Court thus held that Title VII "[did] not condemn all private,
voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans," despite the
text's apparent literal prohibition of discrimination based on
race. 190
Title VII "was enacted pursuant to the commerce power," and
so does not "incorporate and particularize the commands of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."191 What this means is that,
particularly in regard to private employment, there is no Equal Pro
tection requirement contained in Title VII,192 At the same time,
the Court recognized that the literal dictates of Title VII cannot be
completely ignored. Thus the Court required that affirmative ac
tion plans be limited in their impact in order to avoid "unnecessa
rily trammel [ing] the interests of the white employees."193
Permissible affirmative action plans, according to the Court, cannot
require a white person be fired and replaced with a black person. 194
In addition, the plan must be a temporary measure put in place to
"eliminate a manifest racial imbalance," and it cannot "create an
absolute bar to the advancement of white employees. "195 In so
finding, the Court tried to balance the protection Title VII affords
white employees,196 while promoting the "ultimate statutory goals"
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,197

188. [d. at 201 (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892)).
189. [d. at 202 (citing United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315
(1953) (internal quotes omitted)).
190. [d. at 208.
191. [d. at 207 n.6.
192. [d.
193. [d.
194. [d. at 208 (citing McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273
(1976)).
195. [d.
196. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 280.
197. Weber, 443 U.S. at 207.
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REAFFIRMING WEBER: JOHNSON V.
TRANSPORTATION AGENCY

In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 198 the Court again
looked at the question of affirmative action first decided in Weber.
If the Court had wanted to overrule its original decision, this would
have been a good time to do it. Instead, the Court reinforced its
finding in Weber and expanded it to include public sphere applica
tions of workplace affirmative action. In this case, the affirmative
action program was one promulgated by the Transportation Agency
of Santa Clara County. Johnson, a white male, was passed over for
road dispatcher in favor of a female applicant, Joyce. Both were
qualified, Johnson receiving a score of 75 out of 80 on the relevant
aptitude test (tied for second among seven applicants); Joyce was
next, having scored a 73. 199
What is most interesting about the holding in Johnson is the
Court's finding that once a majority plaintiff has established a
prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas
test, a valid affirmative action plan is an acceptable nondiscrimina
tory reason for the employment decision which shifts the burden
back to the plaintiff. 2oo Once the defendant employer demonstrates
its affirmative action plan, the burden is on the plaintiff to show
that the program itself is invalid and is in reality only a pretext for a
decision which has no valid nondiscriminatory justification.201 That
an affirmative action program is a valid nondiscriminatory business
decision follows the Court's holding in Weber, where the Court
found that "taking race into account was consistent with Title VII's
objective of breaking down old patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy.''202
Even more interesting was the Court's acceptance of Justice
Blackmun's concurrence in Weber:
As Justice Blackmun's concurrence made clear, Weber held that
198. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
199. Id. at 623-24.
200. /d. at 626 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78
(1986» ("We held that the ultimate burden remains with the employees to demonstrate
the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action program . . . .") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
201. Id. According to the Johnson Court the Weber decision "was grounded in
the recognition that voluntary employer action can playa crucial role in furthering Title
VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination in the workplace, and that
Title VII should not be read to thwart such efforts." Id. at 630.
202. Id. at 628 (internal quotes and cites omitted).
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an employer seeking to justify the adoption of a plan need not
point to its own prior discriminatory practices, nor even to evi
dence of an "arguable violation" on its part. Rather, it need
point only to a "conspicuous ... imbalance in traditionally segre
gated job categories."203

Under this reasoning, it isn't necessary for an employer to
demonstrate that the employer itself had ever discriminated in its
employment practices, only that the job category itself has been
"traditionally segregated."204 In such circumstances, affirmative ac
tion designed to end that traditional segregation is acceptable under
Title VII.
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens argued that the ruling of
McDonald 205 was no longer controlling: "Neither the 'same stan
dards' language used in McDonald, nor the 'color blind' rhetoric
used by the Senators and Congressmen who enacted the bill, is now
controlling."206 According to Stevens, at least, McDonald had been
functionally overruled by Weber and Johnson.
Stevens also said that the decision in Weber, and now in John
son, is drawn from "[t]he logic of antidiscrimination legislation
[which] requires that judicial constructions of Title VII leave
'breathing room' for employer initiatives to benefit members of mi
nority groupS."207 It is the logic of the statute-the very purpose of
this remedial statute itself-which determines that voluntary af
firmative action was permissible in some circumstances because a
prohibition of every type of "affirmative action would bring about
an end completely at variance with the purpose of the stat
ute ...."208 This purpose, according to the Court in Johnson, was
to "open employment opportunities for blacks in occupations that
had been traditionally closed to them. "209 The Court has twice con
203.
204.

[d. at 630 (emphasis added).

[d. See also id. at 652 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("While employers must have
a firm basis for concluding that remedial action is necessary, neither Wygant nor Weber
places a burden on employers to prove that they actually discriminated against women
or minorities.").
205. "We therefore hold today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination
against the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applica
ble were they Negroes and Jackson white." McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
206. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring).
207. [d. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring).
208. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) (quoting
United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953)) (internal quotes
omitted).
209. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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strued Title VII as permitting private affirmative action in the
workplace so long as the employer can point to a "manifest . . .
imbalanc[e] in traditionally segregated job categories."210 As long
as the employer can make this showing, the Court will not interfere
with the employer's business decision because "Congress intended
that traditional management prerogatives be left undisturbed to the
greatest extent possible. "211
VII.

THE CREATION OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION UNDER
TITLE VII: McDoNALD v. SANTA FE TRAIL
TRANSPORTATION CO.

In 1976, before they had considered Weber and Johnson, the
Supreme Court saw its first 'reverse discrimination' case under Title
VII. In McDonald, the Court gave short shrift to the legislative
history of the statute, and simply stated that "the uncontradicted
legislative history [shows] that Title VII was intended to cover
white men and women and all Americans."212 In McDonald, two
white workers had been fired by their employer for stealing. 213 A
third employee caught stealing, who was black, was not fired. 214
The two white workers brought suit, alleging discrimination in vio
lation of Title VII.21S The Court in McDonald said that Title VII's
"terms are not limited to discrimination against members of any
particular race. "216
However, while recognizing that "Title VII tolerates no racial
discrimination, subtle or otherwise,"217 the Court also differenti
ated between simple discrimination and affirmative action, and said
that the decision in McDonald did not address "the permissibility of
such a program, whether judicially required or otherwise
prompted."218
Thus when the Supreme Court first held that Title VII pro
tected all persons, it still recognized that there was a difference be
tween hostile discrimination and the benign discrimination of
affirmative action. In addition, Justice Marshall made his statement
210.
211.
212.
omitted).
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 650 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 197).
Id. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring).
McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (citation
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 276.
at 275.
at 278-79.
at 280 n.8 (emphasis omitted).
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that the uncontradicted legislative history. showed that whites and
blacks were meant to be treated the same under the statute after
only a cursory examination of that legislative history. In this case,
the legislative history went uncontradicted. In Weber and Johnson
that view of the legislative history was specifically contradicted.
The result was, as Justice Stevens said, that "the same standards"
language used in McDonald was no longer controlling. 219 Logi
cally, this statement is necessarily true: if the Court could uphold
affirmative action programs that promoted blacks and women over
white men based on race and sex, then clearly white men, while
protected by Title VII, could not possibly receive the protection of
Title VII under the same standards as blacks or women.
McDonald also did not require that all plaintiffs receive the
same prima facie test. 220 In a footnote, Justice Marshall noted that
the McDonnell Douglas test had required, as its first prong, that the
plaintiff be a member of a racial minority group.221 If this were
true, then the plaintiffs in McDonald would have been unable to
make out a case of discrimination. Marshall did not offer an alter
native version of the McDonnell Douglas test for use in reverse dis
crimination cases. Instead he simply noted that plaintiff was not
prevented from being able to make out a claim of discrimination
cognizable under Title VII simply because the case did not fit into
the rubric of McDonnell Douglas. 222 The McDonnell Douglas test
was "set out only to demonstrate how the racial character of the
discrimination could be established in the most common sort of
case, and not as an indication of any substantive limitation of Title
VII's prohibition of racial discrimination."223 Here Marshall sug
gests that the McDonnell Douglas test is not required for, or even
appropriate in, all cases.
VIII.

THE ARGUMENT AGAINST UNEQUAL PROTECTION:
JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S DISSENT IN WEBER

The central argument against the idea that Title VII allows af
firmative action was made by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in
Weber. To this day it is cited by those opposed to affirmative action
as the definitive statement on the issue. In making his argument,
219. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 644 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
220. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6.
221. [d. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973».
222. /d.
223. [d.
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Justice Rehnquist looked at a legislative history very different from
that detailed in Part III of this Note.
In Part III A of his dissent, Justice Rehnquist reviewed the
House debates to find that "the Court's interpretation of Title VII
is totally refuted by the Act's legislative history."224 Viewing this
statement in the context of the legislative history outlined above,
this statement is arguably a complete misreading of the meaning of
the Act's legislative history. Whatever else the legislative history
may do, it does not refute the majority's holding in Weber. In find
ing that Title VII "does not condemn all private, voluntary, race
conscious affirmative action,"225 the majority relied on much of the
legislative history cited in this Note. Justice Rehnquist is reading a
different history than the majority.
Justice Rehnquist began his review by acknowledging that
"employment discrimination against Negroes provided the primary
impetus for passage of Title VII. "226 In acknowledging the employ
ment problem this way, however, he minimizes the repeated and
lengthy discussions of the majority in Congress detailing the seri
ousness of this problem. He also fails to recognize that Title VII
itself was part of a much larger civil rights bill designed to eliminate
racial discrimination against blacks and other oppressed minori
ties. 227 For instance, Title II of the bill was designed to require
owners of public accommodations, like restaurants and hotels, to
admit all persons regardless of race. 228 To say that racial discrimi
nation in public accommodations was the "impetus" behind that
piece of the Act is to misstate the situation. Discrimination against
blacks was not merely the "impetus" behind Title II, it was the very
purpose of Title II; it was, in and of itself, the wrong requiring a
remedy. If there had been no Jim Crow, no refusals to seat blacks
224. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 229 n.ll (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 208.
226. [d. at 229 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
227. 110 CONGo REC. H1600 (1964) (Comments of Rep. Minish: "The Title is de
signed to utilize to the fullest our potential work force .... This can be done by remov
ing the hurdles that have too long been placed in the path of minority workers who seek
to realize their rights ....").
228. 110 CONGo REC. H15ll (1964). According to Rep. Madden:
This legislation gives the Attorney General and the aggrieved citizen authority
to institute a civil action in Federal court against any person who denies an
individual, because of race ... access to public transportation, interstate travel,
public eating houses, hotels, admission to places of exhibition and public en
tertainment, and other establishments supported by public taxation.
Id.
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at lunch counters, no separate drinking fountains, there would
never have been a need for Title II, and so Title II would never
have existed. Just so with Title VII. Without discrimination against
blacks, Title VII would never have been enacted because there
would have been no wrong egregious enough to require Congres
sional remedy.
Justice Rehnquist also seems to misunderstand the evil of dis
crimination. As Justice Rehnquist would have it: "The evil inherent
in discrimination against Negroes is that it is based on an immuta
ble characteristic, utterly irrelevant to employment decisions. "229
But discrimination is not inherently evil; discrimination as a concept
is neutral. Discrimination is simply the separating of things, or peo
ple, into identifiable groups. Discrimination becomes evil when it is
used to oppress a people. The discrimination that the majority in
Congress was concerned with was the kind of discrimination out
lined in Part IV above; discrimination as implemented in segrega
tion was evil because it "denied the rights of first-class citizenship"
to blacks and other minorities.230 As announced in the Declaration
of Independence, government is instituted to protect these rights. 231
The evil of discrimination that the 1964 Civil Rights Act was de
signed to cure was the oppressive discrimination sanctioned, and
often imposed by, the very government supposedly instituted to
protect its citizens from oppressive discrimination. 232
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist complained that "discrimina
tion" was not defined by the statute; however, everyone involved in
passing the Act knew what the word discrimination meant. It
meant hostile discrimination directed against blacks. 233 It meant
the kind of discrimination that refused to allow two-thirds of blacks
to register to vote in Louisiana;234 that prevented 85% of potential
black voters from registering in 250 counties in the United States;235
the kind of discrimination that relegated thousands of black stu
dents to substandard, segregated education; that did not allow chil
dren to play in parks and playgrounds because they were black
(even when their parent's tax money was used to pay for those pub
229. Weber, 443 U.S. at 230 n.1O (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
230. 110 CONGo REC. H1600 (1964) (comments of Rep. Daniels).
231. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
232. Lovey, supra note 50, at 8.
233. 110 CONGo REC. H1600 (1964) (statement of Rep. Daniels: "Racial discrimi
nation still persists throughout our land .... Twenty million Negroes are still denied the
rights of first class citizenship.").
234. [d.
235. 110 CONGo REC. H1517 (1964) (comments of Rep. Cellar).
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lic facilities);236 the kind of discrimination that forced an entire peo
ple to live with the "degradation, misery, and human indignities
which attend second class citizenship ...."237 Discrimination, as a
word, went undefined in the Act because a definition must have
seemed, to those members of Congress, unnecessary and
superfluous.
It is only by failing to understand Title VII within the context
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, by failing to see the larger historical
and social context that led to the Act's adoption in the first place,
that Justice Rehnquist is able to declare that the holding in Weber
"introduces into Title VII a tolerance for the very evil that the law
was intended to eradicate ...."238
There are other problems with Justice Rehnquist's analysis of
the legislative history. As pointed out in Justice Blackmun's con
currence, for example, most of the history Justice Rehnquist cites to
support the idea that Title VII "forbids" affirmative action is actu
ally only useful to demonstrate that Title VII does not "require"
affirmative action. 239 This is obviously a very important distinc
tion-one that Justice Rehnquist ignores. This failure to recognize
the subtlety of language crops up more than once in Justice Rehn
quist's exegesis. For example, he cites Republican supporters for
the statement that what Title VII must do is remove "[a]ll vestiges
of inequality based solely on race,"240 but he fails to note that this
statement does not say that Title VII will remove all discrimination;
it says it will remove inequality-a much larger conclusion, and one
perfectly consonant with affirmative action and the holding of the
majority.
This failure to read the subtleties of language is revealed again
in Justice Rehnquist's complaint that the majority has misread
§ 703(j)241 of the statute. 242 The section plainly says that the Act is
not to be "interpreted to require any employer ... to grant prefer
ential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the
236. 110 CONGo REC. H1529 (1964) (statement of Rep. McCulloch).
237. 110 CONGo REC. H1627 (1964) (statement of Rep. Halpern). Such "degrada
tions," according to Congressman Halpern, included: "squalid housing conditions; sec
ond-rate educational opportunities; employment at the lowest rung of the economic
ladder." Id.
238. United Steelworkers of America V. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254-55 (1979)
(Rehnquist, I., dissenting).
239. ld. at 215 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 232 n.12 (Rehnquist, I., dissenting).
241. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(j).
242. Weber, 443 U.S. at 227 (Rehnquist, I., dissenting).
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race
of such individual or group."243 The most that Justice
Rehnquist can muster against the obvious reading that the statute
clearly does not prohibit preferential treatment, it simply does not
require it, is to say that this reading is "outlandish" when read in
conjunction with §§ 703 (a) & (d),244 and that it contradicts the leg
islative history of the Act,245 which, as has already been shown, is
simply not the case.
An aspect of Justice Rehnquist's dissent which must be an
swered is the assertion that the language of the statute simply "pro
hibits a covered employer from considering race when making an
employment decision,"246 and thus contradicts the majority's hold
ing. A reading of the statute's plain language, according to Justice
Rehnquist, precludes the possibility of affirmative action. In
§703(a),247 the statute clearly says that it is unlawful to "discrimi
nate against any individual ... because of such individual's race."248
It is, under current law, impossible to argue that choosing to hire a
black candidate over a white candidate in order to integrate a tradi
tionally segregated job category does not entail discriminating
"against" the white person because of his race but instead entails
discriminating in favor of the black person because of his. This is a
classic representation of disparate treatment-where persons other
wise roughly equivalent are treated differently solely because of
race. 249 In other words, the white person is not being passed over
because he is white-he is being passed over because the other can
didate is black. As the law stands today, this situation is no differ
ent than the more traditional and more troubling case where a
black person is not hired because he is black.
One answer to Justice Rehnquist's reading of the statute, that
the express language of Title VII "prohibits a covered employer
from considering race when making an employment decision," is to
say that the statute does not say that. Had Congress wanted to
"prohibit[] a covered employer from considering race when mak
ing an employment decision"250 it certainly could have said so in
the simple and express terms Justice Rehnquist uses. That it did not
243. 42 u.s.c. § 2000-20). See also Weber, 443 U.S. at 227 n.8 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
244. 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-2(a) & (d).
245. Weber, 443 U.S. at 227-29 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
246. ld. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
247. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a).
248. ld.; Weber, 443 U.S. at 227 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
249. See, e.g., McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2001).
250. Weber, 443 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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say what Justice Rehnquist wanted it to say means that the statute
does not necessarily mean what Justice Rehnquist wanted it to
mean. 251
Still, this cannot be a complete answer to Justice Rehnquist's
charge. The best way to understand the argument against Justice
Rehnquist's reading of the statute is to see Justice Rehnquist's ver
sion of the statute in action. And to do that we have to return to
where we began, to Wayne Tappe and his Title VII suit against Alli
ance Capital Management.
If one accepts the reasoning in Tappe II, what becomes the
identifying characteristic for protection under Title VII is not
Tappe's status, but the status of his fellow co-workers. That they
belong to protected classes makes his firing suspect. However, this
is only the case because of the way the court has read the first prong
of the test to mean that everyone is a member of a protected class
because equal protection requires it. Therefore, the first three
prongs of the test are essentially eliminated as a matter of law. Any
time a person is fired he has suffered an adverse employment ac
tion. Further, because he was presumably qualified for the job in
the first place (since he must have been hired in order to be availa
ble for firing), then the fourth prong would be proved simply by the
fact of his being fired. Even the Tappe II court refuses to go this
far, so it adds two further points: 1) Tappe was the most productive
member of his group, and 2) an inference can be made that Alli
ance was afraid that if it had fired another member of the group it
would have faced a Title VII suit. 252
There are a number of troubling aspects with the Tappe II
court's conclusions-conclusions which seem to follow implicitly
from Justice Rehnquist's reading of Title VII. One problem with
the test as transformed by the court is that it fails to satisfy the
essential function of the test itself, which is to "raise[ ] an inference
of discrimination because [of employment actions that], if otherwise
unexplained, are more likely than not based on consideration of im
permissible factors," (i.e., race, sex, religion or national origin).253
251. See, e.g., id. at 253-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Our task in this case, like
any other case involving the construction of a statute, is to give effect to the intent of
Congress. To divine that intent, we traditionally look first to the words of the
statute ....").
252. Tappe v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 198 F. Supp. 2d 368, 376 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
253. Tappe v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 177 F. Supp. 2d 176, 184 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (citing Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981».
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Unless one believes, as Part IV of this Note shows is not true, that
discrimination and the effects of discrimination are things of the
past, then the version of the McDonnell Douglas test created by the
Tappe II court simply fails to eliminate other reasonable hypotheses
for Tappe's termination. Perhaps Tappe was paid more than the
other managers, and thus firing him made sense financially for his
employer. Perhaps Tappe's "profile" didn't fit with the business
model going forward because his style, his experience, his qualifica
tions, did not fit in with that plan. Perhaps Tappe was simply the
least personable of the group and was fired for that reason. There
are a number of possibilities which might explain why Wayne Tappe
was let go. Of course, when a black employee is fired it is possible
that one or more of these non-discriminatory reasons played a part.
However, this awareness only serves to highlight a fundamental dif
ference between Tappe and a similarly-situated, black employee.
While non-discriminatory possibilities exist for both terminations,
Tappe is not part of a class against whom such justifications have
historically been used to conceal invidious discrimination. The Mc
Donnell Douglas test operates to shift the benefit of the doubt (or
the burden of proof).254 In the case of the black employee, it makes
sense to require the employer to justify his decision when there is
the possibility of racist discrimination. In the case of a white male
like Tappe, it makes no sense at all to require the employer to ex
plain his decision as based upon non-prohibited criteria. Instead,
the history of the statute and the purpose behind the McDonnell
Douglas test both suggest that because racism is such an unlikely
cause of his firing, the burden should be on Tappe to prove that he
was in fact fired because of invidious discrimination.
Another problem with the holding in Tappe II, and with Justice
Rehnquist's reading of Title VII, is that it is no longer sufficient for
the black applicant or employee to be qualified for the job that he
or she has been hired for. The Tappe II reading would prevent em
ployers from hiring or promoting members of minority groups un
less the employer can show that the prospective or current
employee is at least as qualified, if not more qualified, than a white
counterpart. After all, the Tappe II court reasoned that employers
who use permissible criteria in making employment decisions gen
erally do not fire their most productive workers. 255 As workplaces
become more diverse, whenever any worker is fired perhaps he will
254.
255.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
See Tappe II., 198 F. Supp. at 376.
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have a claim under Title VII. All he need show is that someone of
a different race did not perform as well,256 this despite the fact that
"there is rarely a single, best qualified person for a job. "257 Em
ployers who attempt to bring diversity into the workplace will be
subject to lawsuits under the very statute designed to bring diversity
into the workplace. 258 The very idea that a member of a minority
group might attempt to use Title VII to vindicate his rights creates a
cause of action under Title VII for white employees. Title VII, an
anti-discrimination statute, may thus become a statute used to har
ass employers and constrict their legitimate business decisions.
Here, the central problem of the Tappe II decision and Justice
Rehnquist's reading of Title VII is revealed. Imagine that a black
lawyer in 1965 is hired into a formerly segregated law firm in the
South. Let's assume that he is qualified for the position, but only
minimally, because, of course, he's had few opportunities to prac
tice his profession. Now imagine a white lawyer who also applied
for the position and didn't receive it, even though he is in many
ways more qualified because he has more experience than the black
lawyer who was hired. According to Tappe II, and according to
Justice Rehnquist's reading of Title VII, the white applicant would
have a prima facie case under Title VII because "employers moti
vated by profit or other legitimate reasons do not" fail to hire the
"best qualified" applicant. 259 Now imagine the white lawyer is
hired, and the black lawyer is not. The black lawyer would not be
able to make out a prima facie case because, after all, the white
applicant was best qualified under the only allowable criteria. Em
ployers, under these circumstances, would be foolish to hire anyone
but the most qualified for any job, because to do otherwise would
subject them to liability. This reading of Title VII surely under
mines the purposes of the statute since it would simply freeze the
employment situation of 1965 just as it was. This cannot logically
be what Congress intended, and when the legislative history is ex
amined, there is no doubt that this is not what Congress intended.
Justice Rehnquist's reading of Title VII, that Congress wanted to
"prohibit[] a covered employer from considering race when mak
256. See, e.g., Collins v. Sch. Dist., 727 F.Supp. 1318 (1990).
257. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641 n.17 (1987) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
258. But see id. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The logic of antidiscrimination
legislation requires that judicial constructions of Title VII leave 'breathing room' for
employer initiatives to benefit members of minority groups.").
259. Tappe /I, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
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ing an employment decision,"26o is simply nonsensical.
IX.

UNEQUAL PROTECTION: HONORING THE PURPOSE OF
TITLE VII

The problem then is that the Tappe II court's interpretation of
the McDonnell Douglas test precludes any consideration of race or
other protected classification from being used to make a legitimate
business decision, however banal or benign that consideration may
be. The use of the McDonnell Dougias test in this way makes pri
vate diversity efforts illegal per se. Voluntary, informal efforts by
an employer to diversify a traditionally segregated workplace-a
workplace like the upper echelons of a financial services company,
or the partnership of a major law firm-would too often be illegal
under Title VII.
As this Note has endeavored to show, this is not what Title VII
was supposed to do: in Johnson, a concurring Justice Stevens
opined that "Congress [in enacting Title VII] intended that tradi
tional management prerogatives be left undisturbed to the greatest
extent possible. "261 In addition, Congress had made clear that one
of the purposes of Title VII was to encourage private voluntary ef
forts to improve the racial situation in the United States. 262 The
McDonnell Douglas test was not designed as a method for investi
gating the legitimate private employment choices of businesses. 263
At least one United States Court of Appeals has explicitly held
that the McDonnell Douglas formulation was simply not created to
protect whites at all. 264 "Racial discrimination against whites is for
bidden, it is true, but no presumption of discrimination can be
based on the mere fact that a white is passed over in favor of a
black."265 Why not? If Title VII is intended to protect both whites
and blacks equally, then why shouldn't whites be able to make out a
presumption of discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie test under the same standards as a member of a pro
tected class?
The answer, as revealed in the legislative history detailed
above, and the socio-historical context which led to the enactment
260. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 220 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
261. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring).
262. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 2393 (1964).
263. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 207.
264. Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 573, 577 (7th Cir. 1986).
265. [d.
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of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, is that Title VII was never intended to
protect white males at all. After McDonald, Johnson and Weber,
there is a strong argument to be made that while Title VII protects
all persons from invidious employment discrimination, it does not
and should not protect all persons equally.266 And while the osten
sibly neutral language of the statute protects white males, it cannot
be suggested, in light of the historical context in which Title VII was
passed, and as elucidated by its legislative history, that Title VII, or
any section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, was implemented to pro
tect anyone other than racial minorities, particularly African
Americans. 267
As Justice Stevens wrote in his Johnson concurrence, "neither
the 'same standards' language used in McDonald, nor the 'color
blind' rhetoric used by the Senators and Congressmen who enacted
the bill, is now controlling."268 The Court has recognized, at least in
part, that under Title VII not all forms of racial discrimination are
the same. Affirmative action plans, the Court has said, must be le
gal in order to further the fundamental purpose of TItle VII. In
addition, the Court has stated several times that because Title VII
was passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause and not the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment there is no equal protection requirement
inherent in the law. 269 The court in Tappe II implicitly ignored this
finding, just as it ignored Weber and Johnson, by requiring that all
plaintiffs have their cases viewed under the same standard. By do
ing so, the Tappe II court imported an equal protection standard
into Title VII that the Supreme Court had explicitly said was not
there. This part of the Tappe II decision appears to be unprece
dented. There appears to be no case in which a federal court has
applied strict scrutiny to a court-made presumption, and then found
that the presumption, created by the court, must be applied equally
or the underlying statute will be unconstitutional.
Strict scrutiny, it should be remembered, was initially sug
gested by the Court to protect the interests of "discrete and insular
266.

See id.

267. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 646 (Stevens, J., concurring)
("[T]he statute does not absolutely prohibit preferential hiring in favor of minorities; it
was merely intended to protect historically disadvantaged groups against
discrimination ....").
268. [d. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring).
269. [d. at 628 n.6 ("Title VII ... was enacted pursuant to the commerce power to
regulate purely private decisionmaking and was not intended to incorporate and partic
ularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.") (quoting United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 n.6 (1979».
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minorities."27o In early strict scrutiny cases, the Court was con
cerned with such things as "legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group."271 Prior to 1989, the Supreme Court
had recognized that racially benign government actions were differ
ent than those which harmed or isolated specific minority groups:
"Government may take race into account when it acts not to de
mean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast
on minorities by past racial prejudice ...."272
But that recognition changed with Richmond v. 1.A. Croson,273
when the Court for the first time applied strict scrutiny to a govern
ment sponsored affirmative action program. As Justice Marshall,
the author of McDonald, said in his Croson dissent: "A profound
difference separates governmental actions that themselves are ra
cist, and governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of
prior racism .... "274 Justice Marshall went on to point out that the
only possible justification for the sudden change was the apparent
belief on the part of the majority that "racial discrimination [was]
largely a phenomenon of the past ...."275 Justice Marshall was
justified in his belief that America was nowhere near "eradicating
racial discrimination or its vestiges."276
Strict scrutiny is applied to governmental actions only. Be
cause it cannot be used to investigate private employment, there
was no basis for the Tappe II court to use strict scrutiny to investi
gate the private program at issue. The Tappe II court's duty was to
interpret the law that Congress had passed, using the standards
enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonald and Weber and
other Title VII cases. There is no indication from any of these cases
that courts must examine every Title VII claimant under precisely
the same standards. In fact, the Court has noted on numerous occa
sions that the McDonnell Douglas test is not a rigid formula to be
applied the same way to every case-rather it is a flexible test de
signed to root out discriminatory actions that, on their face, may
appear unrelated to race.2 77
There have been other attempts to get around the McDonnell
270. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
271. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
272. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 325 (1978) (Bren
nan, J., concurring).
273. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
274. Id. at 551-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
277. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
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Douglas problem. One solution was formulated in Parker v. The
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad CO.278 Karl Parker, an employee of the
B & 0 Railroad, had for several years tried unsuccessfully to get a
promotion from conductor to fireman. He charged "essentially that
affirmative action constituted unlawful reverse discrimination. "279
In response, B & 0 Railroad acknowledged it had "engaged in af
firmative action ... [in order] to overcome the underutilization of
minorities and women in various jobs" during part of the time
Parker alleged he had suffered an adverse employment decision. 280
Therefore, the Court was confronted with a direct challenge to an
"employer's efforts to improve the record of [its] hiring prac
tices"281 by a white employee who felt his rights under Title VII had
been violated. The Court, however, found the facts as presented
insufficient to determine whether B & 0 Railroad's plan was valid
under the Weber criteria.282
At least one of the adverse employment decisions Parker
claimed to have suffered came after B & O's affirmative action plan
had expired.283 For this part of the complaint, the court looked to
see whether Parker had, or could establish, a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas. 284 In addressing the McDonnell Douglas test,
the court pointed out that the test was simply a "procedural embod
iment of the recognition that our nation has not yet freed itself from
the legacy of hostile discrimination."285 The court then discussed
how the McDonnell Douglas test must be adjusted to reflect vari
ous circumstances brought by plaintiffs. 286
In order to account for the different circumstances of different
plaintiffs, the court enunciated what has come to be called "the
background circumstances test." The background circumstances
test is a modification of the first prong of McDonnell Douglas
278. 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
279. Id. at 1013.
280. Id. at 1015.
281. Id. at 1013.
282. Id. at 1016.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1016-17 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973».
285. Id. at 1017. It is interesting to note the use of the term "hostile" to clarify
the word discrimination. It seems that the Parker court recognized that there are differ
ent kinds of discrimination, and that different kinds of discrimination need to be treated
differently by the law.
286. Id. (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981». In Bundy, the
court changed the fourth element of the McDonnell Doug/as test to reflect the particu
lar employment decision of the case. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 951.
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which, in its original incarnation, required the plaintiff to be a racial
minority.287 Obviously the first prong as enunciated could not ap
ply to a white plaintiff, and, as the court says, "it defies common
sense to suggest that the promotion of a black employee justifies an
inference of prejudice against white co-workers in our present soci
ety."288 So the court found that for a majority plaintiff to establish
the first prong of McDonnell Douglas in order to allow a "fact
finder to infer discriminatory motive" the white plaintiff must show
"intentionally disparate treatment when background circumstances
support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer
who discriminates against the majority."289
The solution in Parker has much to recommend it. The back
ground circumstances test avoids the problem, exemplified by
Tappe II, of courts inserting themselves too far into private em
ployer's employment decisions. Instead of requiring that the em
ployer hire the "best" employee, based on some strict, objective
model, the court in Parker keeps the burden of establishing a prima
facie case back where it belongs, on the employee, by requiring the
plaintiff to demonstrate the likelihood of intentional discrimination
on the part of the employer. Given the lack of significant anti
white discrimination in the workforce, the Parker test offers one
rational solution to the McDonald/Weber problem.
The Parker test, however, is itself unsatisfactory in a number of
ways. For one, it still takes charges of racist employment discrimi
nation against whites too seriously. It is the rare discrimination
case brought under Title VII where the plaintiff is a white man al
leging that he suffered an adverse employment decision because he
was white and his employer held a racial animus against white peo
ple. 290 In these instances, the Parker test may be appropriate.
However, the great majority of reverse discrimination cases argue
that the white employee was fired because the other employees
287. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017 (see McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973».
288. [d.
289. See id. at 1017 n.9 ("We do not equate lawful affirmative action with discrim
ination against the majority, nor do we suggest that [such a] program would ... consti
tute suspicious circumstances sufficient to justify an inference of discriminatory intent
under McDonnell Douglas.").
290. See, e.g., Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2002); Ditzel v. Univ. of Med. and Den
tistry of New Jersey, 962 F. Supp. 595 (D.N.J. 1997); DeCapua v. Bell-Atlantic, New
Jersey, 313 N.J.Super. 110 (1998).
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were persons of a protected class. 291 In these cases, the plaintiff is
using Title VII as a sword to attack the very diversity Title VII was
designed to encourage. Courts should simply refuse to recognize
such claims as allowing for recovery, and instead should look at
such situations as examples of Title VII working as it was designed.
Courts should return to the clear and unmistakable wording of the
first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test; if the plaintiff is not a
member of a protected class, i.e., a racial minority or a woman, then
the McDonnell Douglas test is an inappropriate method of estab
lishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination, and the
plaintiff should not be allowed to avail himself of it. If he wants to
prove racial discrimination he will have to overcome the strong pre
sumption the facts of our society rationally suggest-that racism
against whites is a non-issue.
CONCLUSION

In a sense, Title VII creates a floor below which the employer
may not go. It does not prevent him from hiring and firing who he
wishes. Rather it imposes on him a certain burden to justify an ad
verse employment decision in the case of a minority precisely be
cause the possibility of the decision being based on a racist or other
discriminatory reason is, based on our nation's history, such a viable
and unacceptable possibility. When he makes an employment deci
sion that works against a white person, this suspicion does not exist,
and the necessity of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test is ob
viated. In this way, Title VII can be thought of as a mild form of
government sponsored affirmative action.
Formal affirmative action plans have been one way that busi
nesses have worked to diversify their workplaces. 292 At the same
time, private, informal efforts at diversity are recognized by many
business leaders as essential to keeping their businesses viable into
the 21st century.293 Diversity efforts, whether formal or informal,
are both forward looking and progressive. In part they are retro
spective efforts to remedy the prior wrong of segregation-to use
an analogy from tort law, affirmative action may be necessary until
291. A Westlaw search-"reverse discrimination" & "hostile work environment"
& "white male" & "Title VII "-reveals forty-seven cases in the database. A similar

search excluding the "hostile work environment" phrase increases the number to 472.
292. Eskridge, supra note 176, at 1494.
293. See Brief of Amicus Curiae 65 Leading Businesses in Support of Respon
dents, at 1, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-516) (arguing that a di
verse workforce is "important to amici's continued success in the global marketplace").
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black Americans, and other traditionally and currently oppressed
minorities, are made whole: that is, put in the position they would
have been in had they come to America as equal partners with
whites. 294 At the same time, diversity itself is necessary to a healthy
workplace in our increasingly diverse society.295 A business with an
all white face is less likely to draw customers from a rainbow of
potential consumers.
When the day comes when all traces of past discrimination are
gone, any act of discrimination against any person based on race
will be execrable, and should be subject to society's condemnation.
When that day comes, Title VII should be read as equally protect
ing all persons from invidious discrimination. But that day is not
yet here, and until it is, justice requires, and the law should allow,
employers to make value judgments between types of discrimina
tion to favor of those who traditionally have been discriminated
against, even when that favoritism may thwart the interests of those
who have traditionally enjoyed the fruits of discrimination. One
way to achieve this goal is to recognize that some forms of racial
discrimination are different than others and ought to be treated as
such. To deny this fact, to pretend that all forms of discrimination
are the same, only slows the arrival of the day when racial discrimi
nation finally vanishes from the American landscape.
A reading of Title VII which does not allow this to happen-in
other words, the Tappe II court's reading-will simply ensure that
the ultimate statutory purpose of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the par
tial remediation of 350 years of overt, government sanctioned ra
cism, will never come about. This, as the Weber Court said, would
be ironic indeed. 296 More, it would be another missed opportunity
for the nation to live up to the ideals of our founding: to give all
persons an equal stake in American life and American liberty, to
give every American a fair shot not only at pursuing happiness, but
of attaining it,297
Michael 1. Fellows
294. Part of this argument, of course, might mean that other minorities also
should not benefit equally from the protections of Title VII. Asian Americans, for ex
ample, have a higher per capita income than do white Americans. On the other hand, a
strong argument can be made that American Indians have suffered just as much, if not
more from hostile discrimination at the hands of white America, and so would also be
entitled to full Title VII protections.
295. See supra note 293.
296. United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,208 (1979).
297. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).

